The puzzle of sea battle involves an argument that is an instantiation of reasoning by cases. Its premises include the conditionals "if there is a/no sea battle tomorrow, it is necessarily so". It has a fatalistic conclusion. Two readings of necessity can be distinguished: absolute and relative necessity. The conditionals are valid for the latter reading. By the restrictor view of "if" in linguistics, the conditionals are not material implication. Instead, the if-clauses in them are devices for restricting the discourse domain that consists of possible futures. As a consequence, the argument is not sound. We present a dynamic temporal logic to formalize this idea. The base of this logic is CTL * without the operator until. The logic has a dynamic operator that shrinks models. The completeness of the logic is shown by reducing the dynamic operator.
The Puzzle of Sea Battle
The puzzle of sea battle is from Aristotle. Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. If there is a sea battle tomorrow, it is necessarily so. If there is no sea battle tomorrow, it is necessarily so. So either necessarily there will be a sea battle tomorrow or necessarily there will be no sea battle tomorrow. Here "necessary" is understood as "inevitable": something is necessary if it is the case no matter what we will do. The conclusion seems fatalistic and unacceptable.
There are two ways out: either arguing that the argument is not sound or arguing that its premises are not all true. The argument is a special case of reasoning by cases: from "φ 1 or φ 2 ", "if φ 1 then ψ 1 " and "if φ 2 then ψ 2 ", we get "ψ 1 or ψ 2 ". The argument has three premises. The first one may be called the principle of excluded future middle. The second and third may be called the principle of necessity of truth: true propositions are necessary.
The previous solutions to this puzzle presuppose the validity of the argument and adopt the latter strategy. They focus on the following issue: how do we ascribe truth values to the statements such as "there will be a sea battle tomorrow"? These statements are called future contingents in the literature: they are about the future but do not have an absolute sense.
These solutions include Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic [5] , Prior's Peircean temporal logic [8] , Prior's Ockhamist temporal logic [8] , the true futurist theory [6] , the supervaluationist theory [11] and the relativist theory [4] . In the first two, the principle of excluded future middle fails. In others, the principle of necessity of truth does not hold. Except Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic, other solutions use branching time models. In a branching time model, time is represented as a tree. At any state, there is only one history but might be many possible futures. We refer to [7] for detailed comparison between these solutions.
There are two senses of necessity, absolute and relative necessity, determined by how we understand whatever we will do. Decision makes the difference. In reality we make decisions to do something or not to do something. So we will not do whatever we are able to do. We may read whatever we will do relative to the domain consisting of the things that we are able to do. We may also read it relative to the domain consisting of the things that we are able to do but have not decided to avoid. Note that doing a thing in the first domain but not in the second involves changing mind. A proposition is absolutely necessary if it is the case no matter which we choose to do from the big domain. A proposition is relatively necessary if it is the case no matter which we choose to do from the small domain. Accordingly, we have two principles of necessity of truth.
The principle of absolute necessity of truth does not hold for future contingents. Assume that the admiral is able to do two things: a and b. Doing a will cause a sea battle tomorrow but doing b will not. He decides to do a. In this case, it sounds plausible to say that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. However, it is strange of saying that there will be a sea battle tomorrow no matter what the admiral will do in the absolute sense.
We think that the principle of relative necessity of truth holds for future contingents. Assume that it is not necessary that φ will be the case. Then someone has a way to act to make φ not the case in the future without changing his decision. In this situation, it seems hard to say that φ will be the case. Therefore, if φ will be the case, it is necessary that φ will be the case.
The puzzle of sea battle disappears under the absolute sense of necessity because the principle of necessity of truth fails for future contingents. However, it is still puzzling under the relative sense of necessity. The principle of excluded future middle is quite intuitive. So all the three premises of the puzzle seem valid. But the conclusion is still problematic. Suppose that doing a will cause a sea battle tomorrow but doing b will not. Assume that the admiral has not made the decision to do a or b. Then it is wrong to say that there will necessarily be a sea battle tomorrow. It is also wrong to say that there will necessarily not be a sea battle tomorrow. So the conclusion of the puzzle is false. How come we get a false conclusion from three valid premises by a sound inference?
The soundness of reasoning by cases presupposes that the two conditionals in it are material implications. However, if the two conditionals are something else, then reasoning by cases might not be a sound argument.
In linguistics, a different view on conditionals is common, that is, the restrictor view. The conditional if φ then ψ is not a connective connecting two sentences. There is no such a connective in natural languages. Utterance of a sentence is always w.r.t. a specific discourse domain. The if-clause if φ is a device for restricting the domain. The conditional if φ then ψ is true w.r.t. a domain if ψ is true w.r.t. the resulted domain. Conditionals collapse to material implications when discourse domains are a singletons. This view can be found in various works including [3] , [2] and [13] . It can be tracked back to Ramsey Test in [9] .
Reasoning by cases is not generally valid under the restrictor view on conditionals. Let ∆ be a discourse domain. Assume that if φ 1 then ψ 1 The discourse domain of the puzzle of sea battle consists of possible futures. The if-clauses "if there is a/no sea battle tomorrow" restrict the domain. However, relative necessity is not a upward monotonic notion w.r.t. the class of possible futures. Therefore, the argument concerning sea battle is not sound. In what follows we present a logic to formalize this idea.
Formal Settings
Let Φ 0 be a countable set of atomic propositions and p range over it. Define a language Φ XL as follows:
where ψ is from Φ X[⋅] , the sub-language of Φ XL generated from Φ 0 under X and
The featured formulas of Φ XL are read as follows:
1. Xφ: φ will be the case in the next moment.
2. Aφ: no matter how the agent will act in the future, φ is the case now, that is, φ is necessary.
3.
[ψ]φ: given ψ, φ is the case.
The principle of excluded future middle is expressed as Xφ ∨ X¬φ and the principle of necessity of truth as [φ]Aφ. Xφ is a temporal formula. p, ⊺ and Aφ are state formulas. [ψ] φ is a temporal formula if φ is, or else a state formula. Later we will see that temporal formulas are evaluated at states into paths and state formulas evaluated just at states.
The other usual propositional connectives and the falsum are defined in the usual way. Eφ, defined as ¬A¬φ, indicates that the agent has a way to act in the future s.t. φ is the case now, that is, φ is possible.
It seems strange to say that the agent has a way to act in the future s.t. φ is the case now. Actually this is fine, as whether a sentence involving future is true or not now might be dependent on how the agent will act in the future. For example, whether a student will pass an exam is dependent on how he will study.
Let W be a nonempty set of states and R a binary relation on it. A sequence w 0 . . . w n of states is called a R-sequence if w 0 R . . . Rw n . As a limit case, w is a R-sequence for any w. (W, R) is a tree if there is a r s.t. for any w, there is a unique R-sequence from r to w. r is called the root. It can be seen that the root is unique and R is irreflexive. R is serial if for any w, there is a u s.t. Rwu.
We say that a tree (W, R) is serial if R is. A serial tree is understood as a time structure encoding an agent's actions (the transitions) and states in time (the nodes). A branching in the tree is interpreted as a situation in which the agent can choose between different possible actions. The seriality corresponds to the fact that the agent can always perform an action at any given time.
Fix a serial tree (W, R). Here are some auxiliary notations. A R-sequence w 0 . . . w n starting at the root is a history of w n . For any states w and u, u is a historical state of w if there is a R-sequence u 0 . . . u n s.t. 0 < n, u 0 = u and u n = w. w is a future state of u if u is a historical state of w. Note that a state can not be a historical or future state of itself.
An infinite R-sequence is a path. A path starting at the root is a timeline. A path w 0 . . . passes through a state x if x = w i for some i > 0. Let π be a path. We use π(i) to denote the i + 1-th element of π, i π the prefix of π to the i + 1-th element, and π i the suffix of π from the i + 1-th element. For example, if π = w 0 . . . , then π(2) = w 2 , 2 π = w 0 w 1 w 2 and π 2 = w 2 . . . . For any history w 0 . . . w n and path u 0 . . . , if
is a serial tree with r as the root and V is a function from Φ 0 to 2 W . Figure 1 illustrates a model. Definition 1 (Semantics). M, π, i ⊩ φ, the formula φ being true at the state π(i) relative to the timeline π in the model M, meets the following conditions:
, ψ) is well given, we mean that M is defined in parallel as follows. Fix a model M = (W, R, r, V ). We say that φ is achievable at w in M if φ is true at w relative to a path from w.
Definition 2 (Update of models). Let M = (W, R, r, V ) be a model, φ a formula and w a state. Assume that φ is achievable at w. Let w 0 . . . w i be the history of w. Define a set X φ w of states as follows: for any x ∈ W , x ∈ X φ w ⇔ (i)
Assume that the agent is at w and decides to make φ true. After the decision is made, some future states are not possible anymore. A state becomes impossible if the agent travels to it, there would be no way to make φ true at w, no matter where he goes afterwards. X φ w is the collection of these states. Figure 2 illustrates how a formula updates a model. , π) might not be well given. Later we will see that π is a timeline of M
A formula φ is valid if for any M, π and i, M, π, i ⊩ φ. Let Γ be a set of formulas and φ a formula. Γ ⊧ φ, Γ entails φ, if for any M, π and i, if M, π, i ⊩ Γ, then M, π, i ⊩ φ. We in the sequel use XL to denote the set of valid formulas.
The Puzzle Is Solved in a Way
The update with φ shrinks models. As a consequence, it restricts possible futures. The following theorem indicates that it restricts possible futures as we wish: it exactly excludes the possible futures which does not satisfy φ.
Let N be the set of natural numbers. Define a function σ ∶ Φ X[⋅] → N as follows: 
Assume the former. Let τ be an arbitrary timeline of M passing through w and sharing the same n elements after w with π. By the inductive hypothesis, M, τ, w ⊩ ψ. Then M, τ, w ⊩ ψ ∧ χ. Let u be the n-th element of π after w. Then u is not in M 
Let τ be an arbitrary timeline of M passing through w and sharing the same n elements after w with π. Then τ shares the same k elements after π(i + 1) with π. By inductive hypothesis, M, τ, i + 1 ⊩ ψ. Then M, τ, i ⊩ Xψ. Let u be the n-th element of π after w. Then u is not in M From Lemma 1 we can get a simple fact: for any φ and ψ in Φ X , [φ]ψ is equivalent to φ → ψ. Based on this fact, we can show this lemma in an inductive way.
If a formula φ contains no A and [⋅], then its truth value at a state relative to a timeline is determined by the timeline itself. As Φ X[⋅] can be reduced to Φ X , what follows is true.
By Lemma 1, ρ is not a path of M φ π(i)
. We have a contradiction.
Let s denote that there is a sea battle. The puzzle of sea battle can be formalized as the inference Xs ∨ X¬s, [Xs]AXs, [X¬s]AX¬s ⊧ AXs ∨ AX¬s. It is easy to see that AXs ∨ AX¬s is not valid. It is also easy to get that the principle of excluded future middle, Xφ ∨ X¬φ, holds. Therefore, the puzzle of sea battle is not a sound argument.
It can be verified that ¬φ ⊧ 
Completeness by Reduction
The idea of showing the completeness of XL is to reduce the dynamic operator
This idea is from dynamic epistemic logic [12] . To reduce [φ], a strategy is to massage [φ] into ψ deeper and deeper until it meets atomic propositions. A difficulty arises when [φ] meets the operator X. To handle this, some pretreatment of φ is needed.
Let Φ PC be the set of formulas of Propositional Calculus.
The operator X can freely go into and out of conjunctions and disjunctions: X(φ ∧ ψ) ↔ (Xφ ∧ Xψ) and X(φ ∨ ψ) ↔ (Xφ ∨ Xψ) are valid. By making a reflection we can see that this lemma holds.
Let Φ XA denote the language generated from Φ 0 under X and A.
Theorem 3. The language Φ XL can be reduced to Φ XA .
Proof. Let θ be a formula in Φ XL . We pick a subformula of θ which is in the form of [φ]ψ where ψ contains no [⋅] . Note that if θ has no such a subformula, then θ contains no [⋅] and is already in Φ XA . Then we do the following things:
4. In the way specified by the last four items of Lemma 7, we let [(ψ n ∨ Xχ n )] into ψ deeper and deeper until it meets atomic propositions. Note when [(ψ n ∨Xχ n )] meets X, it becomes [χ n ]. Then we reduce [(ψ n ∨Xχ n )] in the way specified by the first two items of Lemma 7. We repeat until [(ψ 1 ∨ Xχ 1 )] is reduced.
We repeat until θ contains no [⋅].
The completeness of the logic for the language Φ XA is already shown in the literature. Then we can get the completeness of the logic XL.
Conclusive Remarks
The argument in the puzzle of sea battle is a special case of reasoning by cases. Its premises include the conditionals "if there is a/no sea battle tomorrow, it is necessarily so". It has a fatalistic conclusion: we can not interfere with whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow. The principle expressed by the conditionals are plausible if we read necessity in the relative sense. The conditionals are not material implication. Instead, the if-clauses in them are devices for restricting possible futures. Necessity is not a upward monotonic notion. So the argument is not valid. It is fine that an invalid argument has a fatalistic conclusion. We present a formal way to make this precise. Reading conditionals as material implication makes reasoning by cases valid. This causes others puzzles. Among them is the Puzzle of Miners presented by [10] . [1] proposes a deontic logic based on an extension of CTL * . By applying the approach in this work to the deontic logic, we might get a solution to the Puzzle of Miners. This is our future work.
